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Abstract 
Though the link between technological system 
architectures and buyer-supplier relationships has been 
actively studied, no comprehensive framework 
connecting system structures and component 
purchasing categories exists. We examine the 
technological dependency structures of such systems by 
adopting the buyer’s viewpoint as system assembler and 
integrator. We articulate how system dependencies 
relate to switching costs and needs for investments and 
technological expertise in buyer-supplier relationships. 
By examining the extents and directions of indirect and 
direct dependencies at the technological systems level, 
we are able to identify the purchasing category to which 
each component is most likely to belong. We 
demonstrate our theoretical framework using an 
empirical example of a technological system from the 
energy industry. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Successful organizations effectively manage, 
access, and use both internal and external resources. 
Supplier relationships are key to external resources, and 
when relationship quality is high, both buyer and 
supplier benefit from increased overall competitiveness. 
Organizations are open systems that depend on events 
in the external environment [1]; that is, they do not act 
independently. Relationships range from close and 
intense to distant. But how are the linkages between 
resources and buyer-supplier relationships studied? 
Traditionally, researchers have addressed this question 
by defining components’ modularity levels and 
examining the related buyer-supplier relationships. 
However, modularity alone is insufficient to explain 
buyer-supplier relationship characteristics. Previous 
approaches have found both conflicting and supporting 
results concerning the effects of product architectures on 
inter-organizational relationships [2][3][4]. However, 
the ways in which technological system architectures 
and inter-organizational relationships interact remain 
unknown[5]. 
The present study structures supplier-buyer 
relationships using the purchasing portfolio approach 
[6]. Purchasing portfolio categorization involves 
statements about buyer-supplier relationship 
characteristics, even when this relationship is connected 
to a purchased component. Supply risk and profit impact 
are the classifying dimensions [7]. Portfolio approaches 
have often been criticized for their lack of patterns for 
operationalizing dimensions and of fine-grained or 
widely tested criteria to assign items like components 
and products to categories [7][8]. In addition, product 
interdependencies are not monitored [9]. Researchers 
and practitioners leverage nebulous concepts like supply 
risk and profit impact, even when these concepts are 
defined by subjective decision making rather than 
operationalized measures [10][9]. Systems’ 
technological structures are neglected in purchasing 
portfolio research (with a few exceptions [9][11]), 
though they are discussed elsewhere in supply chain 
literature. However, both the product purchased and its 
technology have been shown to significantly impact the 
buyer-supplier relationship [12].  
In this paper, we develop new measures to allocate 
components to purchasing categories by leveraging 
systems’ indirect and direct technological dependencies. 
The broader question concerning the link between 
system architectures and buyer-supplier relationships is 
narrowed to the purchasing context. We use purchasing 
portfolio categories [6][13] as anchors for our 
theoretical framework development. In addition, we 
limit the buyer’s role to that of an assembler and system 
integrator that sources components from suppliers. 
In this research, switching costs, buyer/supplier 
investments, and the need for technological expertise 
are understood as dependence dimensions that influence 
the buyer-supplier relationship [14]. We use indirect and 
direct technological dependencies to characterize how 
systems’ technological structures affect switching costs, 
buyer/supplier investments, the need for technological 
expertise and, ultimately, the buyer-supplier 
relationship. We leverage Kraljic’s matrix of purchasing 
categories, which already includes switching costs, 
investments, and the need for technological expertise 
[14][13]. Our research objective is to connect system 
architectures and buyer-supplier relationships in the 
purchasing context. Thus, we propose a theoretical 
framework that links system architectures with 
purchasing portfolio categories from the buyer’s 
perspective. Our theory contributes to the strategic 
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 purchasing literature on the characteristics of 
purchasing categories and buyer-seller dependencies. 
Assessments of purchasing portfolio component 
categories have traditionally been subjective; however, 
this paper offers system architecture-based metrics with 
direct practical benefits for purchasing professionals. 
We leverage objective measures to analyze component 
dependencies in technological systems [2], [5], allowing 
managers to better manage dependencies using our 
component-categorizing framework. We demonstrate 
the use of these metrics and the framework through the 
hypothetical example of a technological system from the 
energy industry. 
 
2. Supply chain dependency patterns 
 
2.1 Dependency patterns in supply chains 
 
 In this research, firms are seen as open systems that 
depend on events in their external environments [1]. A 
firm does not control all the resources necessary to 
operate independently; thus, it must interact with its 
environment to survive [1]. Hence, firms are constrained 
by networks of interdependencies with other 
organizations [15]. Dependency patterns form situations 
in which continuous success is uncertain, especially 
when a firm does not know which actors’ actions are 
interdependent [15]. These patterns affect inter-
organizational power, which influences firms’ 
behaviors [15].  
Three main factors affect buyer-supplier 
dependence: resource importance, resource alternatives, 
and buyer’s freedom in deciding resource-related issues 
[16]. Activities can be similar across supply chains, 
creating pooling interdependencies among firms [17]. 
We expect a buyer’s authority over a resource to be 
insignificant when pooling dependencies are high. 
When separate supply chains leverage the same 
resource, the resource supplier can reach economies of 
scale by fitting the resource into different production 
contexts. This may cause reciprocal supply chain 
interdependencies, such that firms from different chains 
interact to adjust resources and separate production 
contexts [17]. Our theory leverages these concepts of 
pooling and reciprocal dependency, since they may help 
clarify when a buyer is more or less likely to have 
authority over resources. 
 
2.2 Purchasing portfolio approach 
 
Purchasing portfolios enable professional 
purchasers to differentiate among suppliers and choose 
the most effective strategy for each relation [11]. Unless 
the resources for building and maintaining partnerships 
are unlimited, different types of relationships are needed 
for different purchases. Partnerships are expensive to 
develop and maintain [12], so it is important to build 
numerous coordination mechanisms instead of 
optimizing only one level of supplier integration [18]. In 
this paper, we do not discuss these coordination 
mechanisms but how to divide the components of the 
purchasing portfolio categories. 
Kraljic’s matrix (1983) (and modifications) 
represents one of the most widely accepted portfolio 
approaches in research and practice [11][13][19]. 
Kraljic’s original work sought to minimize supply risk 
and maximize firms’ buying power. The matrix starts by 
defining supply risks and profit impact, which are two 
dimensions needed to build the categories. Both 
variables can have either “low” or “high” values, 
resulting in a 2x2 matrix with four quadrants: 
noncritical, leverage, bottleneck, and strategic [6]. 
These quadrants are linked to different kinds of 
relationships and purchasing strategies. Kraljic’s second 
matrix addresses the strategic category, which has since 
been complemented by other scholars [12][9][20]. This 
research builds on a descriptive modification of 
Kraljic’s matrix (shown in Figure 1). This modification 
focuses not on the normative patterns of what a firm 
should do, but on the characteristics of the buyer-
supplier relationship. 
Strategic components are typically purchased from a 
single supplier and have high supply risk and profit 
impact. Single-source purchasing involves significant 
risks, which a buyer may attempt to reduce by building 
supplier partnerships. Strategic items do not usually lead 
to fierce price negotiations, but a buyer may accept 
higher prices if a component has a significant profit 
impact. If a firm seeks to reduce its long-term supplier 
dependence risk, it may consider backward integrating 
to achieve in-house production. This purchasing 
strategy seeks to develop long-term, close, and 
collaborative relations with strategic component 
suppliers, which can be seen as extensions of the buying 
firm. Total dependence is at its highest level. Since both 
buyer and supplier are heavily involved in the 
partnership, a balance of power is assumed [21]; 
however, supplier dominance has also been reported 
[14][13]. 
Bottleneck components have low profit impact and 
high supply risk. These components require continuous 
supply, even at additional costs. With these components, 
suppliers have the dominant power position, and total 
interdependence is moderate, but higher than in 
noncritical item relationships [13]. Neither buyers nor 
suppliers are heavily involved in the relationship if 
compared to strategic category. Long-term contracts, 
contingency planning and single sourcing purchasing 
practices are used to secure continuous supply. Buyers 
seek to adapt to their dependence, reduce the negative 
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 consequences of the unfavorable situation, or try to find 
other solutions [14]. 
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Figure 1. Categories, dimensions, and power and 
dependence in the purchasing portfolio matrix [14] 
[13] [21] 
Leverage items are associated with high profit 
impact but low supply risk. These items can be obtained 
from various suppliers, giving buyers the dominant 
negotiating position. There is no need for long-term 
supply contracts; instead, buyers arrange competitive 
bidding among suppliers. Leverage items contribute 
heavily to end product cost, so aggressively maximizing 
buying power may be reasonable. Suppliers’ 
dependence is high, while buyers’ dependence is low. 
Total interdependence is higher than for non-critical 
items, but lower than for strategic items [13]. 
Non-critical items have low profit impact and low 
supply risk. Buyers have many alternative suppliers, and 
vice versa. Neither supplier nor buyer is tied to the other; 
thus, there is a balance of power and a low level of 
interdependence [13]. Since non-critical items require 
significant purchasing time but represent only modest 
profit impact, transactions are characterized by routines 
and pooled purchasing requirements. Efficient 
processing and reductions to logistic and administrative 
complexity are the preferred purchasing approaches. 
We argue that the matrix shown in Figure 1 does not 
fully capture the determinants of the buyer-supplier 
relationship. In particular, it does not recognize 
component dependencies that impact buyer-supplier 
relationships. In the following sections, we explore the 
little-researched topic of how these technological 
system dependencies affect the relationship. 
 
3. Network view of system architecture 
 
3.1 System architecture and modularity 
 
A product architecture defines the product’s 
functions and how these functions are mapped to 
physical components. Second, it specifies the 
component interfaces [22]. Here we use a similar 
concept of technological system architecture that 
extends the product architecture by describing an entire 
system. Technological dependencies between 
components are part of architecture as well as interfaces. 
We do not examine single interfaces per se, but, rather, 
explore technological dependencies at the system level. 
 Modularity in product design enables the creation of 
high levels of component design independence [23]. For 
instance, standardizing component interfaces increases 
modularity. These standardized interfaces define 
components’ functional, spatial, and similar relations. 
Modular products help firms manage outsourcing and 
external manufacturing, since product modularity 
decreases the need for (technical) coordination. By 
contrast, integral architecture exists when one-to-one 
mapping between components and product functions is 
not possible and component interfaces are highly 
interdependent [22]. The body of modularity research 
relies on divisions among modular-integral product 
architectures. This perspective successfully captures 
design extremes; but it does not fully acknowledge the 
components’ intermediate forms of interdependence. In 
particular, the concept of modularity does not consider 
the direction or amount of direct or indirect component 
technological dependence.  
When a buyer cannot find suitable components 
among a supplier’s existing component specifications, it 
may need customized components. Customization is the 
extent to which a product is customized for a buyer. 
Suppliers can serve multiple buyers through 
customization [24]; however, this may be challenging, 
since customization often requires non-transferable 
buyer-specific investments. The emergence of dominant 
designs may ease these challenges. Dominant designs 
help industries transition from customized, made-to-
order products to standardized, mass-manufacturing 
systems. Dominant designs emerge when a market 
accepts a particular product design as the standard for 
the whole product category [25]. Dominant designs can 
be viewed as continuum, such that the majority of 
designs in the industry matter. Usually, dominant 
designs focus on core components, and individual 
changes cause system-level malfunctions [25]. 
Product modules cannot be coordinated solely 
through standardized interface specifications, since 
functional dependency structures (e.g. heat transfer, 
magnetic fields, etc.) that demand coordination remain. 
This is why modular system design is positively linked 
to supplier involvement: Firms must work more closely 
to ensure the compatibility of the modular subsystems. 
Significant changes in system architectures present 
challenges for the firms involved. Changes in system 
5070
 architectures may require shifts in industry structures, 
such as firm boundaries [26] [27]. If a modular 
architecture change to an integral architecture [26], 
reduced compatibility may prevent potential relations 
with certain suppliers in industry. System architecture 
decisions influence formal and informal organizational 
structures; thus, knowledge of system architecture 
improves our understanding of both technological and 
organizational aspects [2][27].  
 
3.2 Buyer and supplier dependence from a technological 
system perspective 
 
This chapter discusses the dimensions of buyer-
supplier dependence in the context of this paper. From a 
technological perspective, buyer dependence on 
suppliers has multiple dimensions, traditionally 
understood as switching costs. Switching costs occur 
when a buyer moves from one supplier to another [28]. 
Switching costs are often discussed as “umbrella” 
constructs that include other costs. We do not follow this 
conceptualization; instead, we use the term “switching 
costs” to describe a buyer’s engineering costs when 
switching suppliers. Overall, we discuss three 
dimensions of a buyer’s dependence on a supplier: 
switching costs, the buyer’s need for the supplier’s 
technological expertise, and the buyer’s investments 
[13][28]. 
 Supplier dependence is measured using the same 
dimensions as buyer dependence: switching costs, 
supplier investments, and the supplier’s need for the 
buyer’s technological expertise [13][28]. These are 
summarized in Table 1. Table 2. show both the 
dimensions of dependence and how these dependencies 
can be understood from a technological system 
perspective. 
Switching component suppliers may require varying 
amounts of buyer-side engineering activities. Even 
small system changes may require adjustments 
elsewhere; however, this depends on a component’s 
indirect and direct influences on the overall system. 
Thus, the extent of engineering—and, thus, a buyer’s 
switching costs—depend on a component’s cyclicality 
and hierarchical location in the system. A component is 
called an in-cycle component [5] if it is part of the cycle 
structure, in which a set of components form a set of 
interdependency paths. A decision to change an in-cycle 
component may force changes in other cycle 
components, which may force other changes until global 
constraints are satisfied. Long cycles with complex 
dependency paths lead to quality defects, greater 
coordination needs, cost overruns, and delays in product 
development [5]. These cyclical structures may trigger 
more changes if they are located at the top of the system 
hierarchy. The higher the position of a component in the 
hierarchy, the more system-level changes are needed to 
change the component. Decisions made at higher levels 
of the hierarchy influence lower levels [29], but 
decisions made at lower levels may not cause influence 
higher levels. From an engineering perspective, 
component cyclicality and hierarchy are challenges for 
inter-organizational teams seeking to develop full-
system subsystems. If component cyclicality and 
hierarchy are not considered, substantial design 
problems may occur. 
 
Table 1. Buyer dependence from a technological 
system perspective. 
Buyer dependence Buyer dependence from a 
technological system perspective 
Switching costs Amount of engineering needed by 
buyer when switching suppliers 
Buyer investments Need to adapt to supplier’s 
component (or product) through 
specific investments 
Need for supplier 
technological 
expertise 
Supplier is providing technological 
expertise (design/manufacturing) 
needed by buyer 
 
Buyer investments (e.g. in manufacturing facilities, 
personnel training, and tooling) enable purchases from 
specific suppliers. To match these purchased 
components, specific processes are customized [12], 
which may cause changes elsewhere in the system. The 
final form of buyer dependence is the buyer’s need for 
the supplier’s technological expertise in areas beyond 
the buyer’s knowledge (e.g. expertise in efficient 
manufacturing or technological expertise).  
From a technological perspective (Table 2.), a 
supplier’s dimensions of dependence are the same as a 
buyer’s. Supplier switching costs are engineering costs 
related to a supplier switching a buyer to another. 
Supplier investments describe investments made for a 
specific buyer (e.g. investments in manufacturing 
facilities, dies, and personnel training) [12]. Depending 
on the component purchased, suppliers may need 
buyers’ critical expertise or specialized knowledge [14]. 
Buyers can provide component specifications and 
guidance on component integration. We assume that the 
need for a buyer’s technological expertise is higher 
when a component is dedicated to and customized for a 
buyer’s specific system. 
 
Table 2. Supplier dependence from a technological 
system perspective. 
Supplier dependence Supplier dependence from a 
technological system 
perspective 
Switching costs Amount of engineering needed 
by a supplier when switching 
buyers 
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 Supplier investments Need to adapt to a buyer’s 
system with specific 
investments 
Need for buyer’s 
technological expertise 
Buyer’s provision of 
technological expertise critical 
to the supplier’s component  
Switching costs and supplier investments have 
partly overlapping dependencies, since, if serving a 
particular buyer demands specific investments, so will 
changing buyers. Though component engineering and 
supplier investments can be closely related in theory, we 
separate these dependencies here, since, in empirical 
settings, they may vary independently. 
 
4. Buyer-supplier relationship and 
technological dependencies 
 
4.1. Connecting technological dependency structures to 
purchasing categories 
 
This chapter connect system architecture 
characteristics to purchasing categories in our 
theoretical framework. A component purchased by a 
buyer has a technological dependency structure that is 
clarified by the concepts of outbound and inbound 
dependence. Outbound dependence indicates the extent 
of components that might be affected by a change to the 
focal component. Inbound dependence indicates the 
components that might affect the focal component if 
they change. Hence, inbound dependence indicates the 
extent to which a component’s design depends on other 
components, while outbound dependence measures the 
extent to which a component affects the design of other 
components. 
Figure 2. presents a theoretical framework that 
connects inbound and outbound dependencies with four 
purchasing categories: leverage, non-critical, 
bottleneck, and strategic. Previous research has already 
connected buyer-supplier dependencies to purchasing 
categories [13][21], and we follow this work by naming 
the categories similarly. Whereas previous work has 
used axes of profit impact and supply risk [13], we use 
inbound and outbound dependence. Our theoretical 
framework contains three dimensions: switching costs, 
buyer or supplier investments, and the need for another 
party’s technological expertise. 
We argue that, when a component’s inbound 
dependence is high, supplier customization increases. 
By contrast, when inbound dependence is low, a 
component’s adaptation to the system is low, and the 
supplier can design its component flexibly, without 
strict buyer requirements. Further, if inbound 
dependence is low, we argue that pooling 
interdependencies and reciprocal interdependencies 
[17] are more likely to exist, since the component can 
more easily fit other technological systems and, thus, 
other supply chains. Thus, the buyer’s authority over 
these components is less significant than in purchasing 
categories that lack pooling and reciprocal 
interdependencies. When a component’s outbound 
dependence is high, the component significantly 
impacts other components. Here, a buyer must adapt its 
system for compatibility, which may require buyer 
investments and increase switching costs.    
Leverage components. When a component has high 
inbound and low outbound dependence, it must adapt to 
other components. If this kind of component is 
outsourced, the buyer must provide a detailed 
description of the kind of component needed [11] to 
ensure system compatibility. Thus, the supplier requires 
the buyer’s technological expertise. 
 
Leverage 
-Buyer dominated
-Buyer switching cost and 
investments are low
-Buyer need of supplier 
technological expertise is low
-Supplier switching costs and 
investments are high
-Supplier need buyer’s 
technological expertise
Strategic
-Balanced power
-Both supplier and buyer make 
investments
-Both supplier and buyer have 
high switching costs
-Both supplier and buyer need 
technological expertise of 
another party
Non-critical
-Balanced power
-Both supplier and buyer have 
low switching costs
-No spesific buyer or supplier 
investments
-Buyer need supplier’s 
technological expertise (but not 
vice versa)
Bottleneck
-Supplier dominated
-Buyer has high switching costs 
and investments
-Buyer need supplier’s 
technological expertise
-Supplier switching costs and 
investments are low
-Supplier do not need buyer’s 
technological expertise
Outbound dependency
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Figure 2. Theoretical framework for connecting 
technological dependencies of a component and a 
purchasing category. 
Suppliers must adapt their production systems to 
produce these components, leading to buyer-specific 
investments and dependence that grow over time, 
especially if the investments are not transferable to other 
buyers. By contrast, the buyer typically does not depend 
heavily on the supplier’s technological expertise, since 
the buyer provides detailed specifications of the 
required component.  
This lower buyer dependence manifests as buyer 
dominance during buyer-supplier negotiations for 
components with high inbound and low outbound 
levels. Due to their low outbound level, these 
components do not affect other system components; 
thus, investment costs remain low, since the supplier can 
be changed and the component delivered without 
considerable engineering work. Switching costs, 
however, are considerable, since buyers must train new 
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 suppliers in their technological requirements. This is the 
main difference between the leverage category and the 
non-critical category. Still, this buyer dependence is not 
as significant as the supplier’s dependence on the buyer.  
Non-critical components. When a component has 
low outbound and inbound values, the technological 
dependency of the entire system is low. These 
components are not sources of technological 
dependency paths because they are independent from 
other components. If this kind of component is 
outsourced, buyers’ component-system coordination 
costs are low, and suppliers have more freedom to 
design components suitable for multiple buyers. This 
may lead to interdependence pooling [17], in which 
different supply chains exploit the same component. 
Buyers’ and suppliers’ switching costs remain low, 
since relationship-specific investments are not 
necessary. Buyers can be more or less dependent on 
suppliers’ technological expertise and/or provide more 
or less of their own specifications [11]. However, since 
inbound dependence is low, suppliers do not require 
buyers’ specifications the way they do for leverage 
components. Since outbound dependence is also low, 
switching suppliers is not challenging for buyers. 
Therefore, components with low outbound dependence 
differ from bottleneck items in that power is balanced 
between buyer and supplier and overall interdependency 
remains low. 
Bottleneck components. When a component has low 
inbound and high outbound values, it has a high position 
in the technological hierarchy. This means that other 
components adapt to its features, and it is not heavily 
influenced by changes made elsewhere in the system. If 
this kind of component is outsourced, the supplier is 
likely to have the technological expertise necessary to 
design the component’s specifications and deliver the 
product [11]. Since the component has high outbound 
dependency, the buyer must adapt its overall system to 
the component; however, since inbound dependency is 
low, the supplier has no need to significantly adapt the 
component to the buyer’s system.  From a technological 
perspective, the supplier is unlikely to make buyer-
specific investments. The technological system 
dependencies create a situation in which the adaptation 
of bottleneck components to other components is not 
technologically meaningful. These components also 
have pooling interdependencies [17] stemming from 
their low inbound dependency, since the supplier has the 
opportunity to leverage economies of scale in 
manufacturing. Reciprocal interdependencies [17] may 
also exist, since multiple buyers from separate supply 
chains may try to influence suppliers to secure 
component compatibility with their own systems; 
however, this purchasing category is likely to be 
dominated by the supplier. 
If available suppliers provide diverse versions of the 
same component, buyers must choose which component 
to target and then adapt their systems for compatibility. 
Here, suppliers may have power over buyers: If other 
suppliers provide incompatible components that require 
significant buyer re-engineering, switching costs will be 
substantial. From a buyer’s engineering perspective, 
switching may be challenging, since these components 
have long dependency paths and require extensive 
engineering work. However, since suppliers do not 
adapt to particular buyers (low inbound dependence), 
they face no technological constraints related to 
switching buyers. 
Strategic components. If a component has high 
outbound and inbound dependencies, it has a high 
position in the technological hierarchy. Still, there are 
other components that influence the emergence of 
system changes. These components adapt to the system, 
and, simultaneously, the system adapts to them. 
Suppliers cannot easily switch to other buyers due to the 
specific investments required by their high inbound 
dependency; that is, suppliers must do engineering work 
to adapt their components to buyers’ systems, thus 
raising switching costs. 
However, buyers also face high investments, 
switching costs, and engineering costs caused by high 
outbound dependence. Both buyer and supplier are 
likely to need the other’s technological expertise: 
Suppliers need buyers’ component specifications to 
ensure compatibility, and buyers need suppliers’ design 
and/or manufacturing expertise [11].  
Strategic components are critical because their high 
outbound and inbound values make them specific to 
certain system configurations. Compatibility with other 
configurations is limited. Supplier and buyer are likely 
to mutually agree on a component design dedicated to 
the buyer’s system. The supplier has no alternative 
buyers for the strategic component, and the buyer has no 
alternative suppliers (at least not without substantial 
costs). Thus, a component with high outbound and 
inbound levels, is likely to create a buyer-supplier power 
balance, since the partners’ high interdependencies limit 
opportunities for switching. 
  
4.2. Measuring direct and indirect technological 
dependencies 
 
In this chapter, we define metrics for outbound and 
inbound dependencies. Direct technological system 
dependencies can be measured using the Design 
Structure Matrix (DSM), which maps the dependencies 
of each component. This captures the degree to which a 
change in any single element directly changes other 
elements. Although DSMs have significant practical 
implications for engineers, these presentations of direct 
dependencies are not sufficient indicators of system 
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 architecture per se [30]. The system can only be 
accurately described if (as in this paper) indirect 
dependencies are added to the analysis. Both the number 
of direct dependencies per component and the way the 
dependencies are distributed across the system are 
important. The literature provides instructions for both 
to build DSMs and measure indirect dependencies [2]. 
Recent literature has successfully used DSM-based 
metrics to comprehensively capture system 
dependencies [2][5][30]. Visibility matrix V derives 
inbound and outbound dependency measures. Visibility 
matrix also reveals indirect dependencies. DSMs for 
direct dependencies are raised to successive powers, and 
the results show the direct and indirect dependencies of 
successive path lengths. These results are summed, and 
all positive values are set to one. Visibility matrix can 
be represented mathematically as follows: 
 
V =  ∑𝑀𝑛 
 
in which M is the DSM of direct dependencies and n = 
[0, f], where f is the longest path in the system. To 
calculate V, one can use matrix multiplication or 
algorithms like Warshall’s algorithm. From visibility 
matrix, two metrics are derived. These describe both a 
component’s potential dependencies and how these 
dependencies relate to the overall system. 
Visibility matrix produces row and column sums for 
each component. We call these metrics of inbound 
dependence (same as visibility fan-in) and outbound 
dependence (same as visibility fan-out), respectively 
[2], and leverage them in our theory development and 
our illustrative example. A component’s inbound 
dependence measure is the sum of all non-zero cells in 
that component’s column in the visibility matrix. The 
inbound dependence measure captures the components 
whose changes might affect the focal component. A 
component’s outbound dependence is the sum of all 
non-zero cells in that component’s row of V. Outbound 
dependence indicates the components that might be 
affected by changes to the focal component. 
 
4.3. Illustrative example: Turbo generator 
 
We provide an example of a turbo generator to 
illustrate inbound and outbound dependencies and the 
application of our framework within a real-world 
technological system. The example comes from an 
engineer with wide knowledge of turbo generators. The 
use of a single, explorative example seems appropriate  
since it adds to our concrete understanding of 
dependencies and system structures. Figure 3. shows the 
components (nodes) of a turbo generator and all possible 
direct and indirect dependencies (edges) among them. 
Thus, Figure 3. visualizes visibility matrix, and the 
edges form dependency paths that span the entire 
system. These paths are like chains through which 
changes to the system structure flow. Components like 
the rotor, turbine stator 1, and turbine stator 2 can be 
seen as sources of edges; these are located upstream, and 
their outbound dependencies are high. Changing one of 
these components may change the components to which 
it points. For example, changing the rotor may change 
turbine stator 1 and turbine stator 2, as well as the 
components to which they point. By contrast, 
components like the bed and frame are located 
downstream; these have high levels of inbound 
dependency, are “targets” or ending points of multiple 
paths, and are likely to adapt to the changes in other 
components. These extremes exist because of the 
component hierarchy. 
Figure 3. illustrates the component hierarchy by 
highlighting these dependency paths. It also shows 
where cyclic groups of the system are located. The end 
ring, the core material (shaft), and the squirrel cage form 
one cyclic group, while the rotor, stator 1, and stator 2 
form another cyclic group. These two cyclic groups are 
highly connected and are not equal in the component 
hierarchy. The turbine rotor, stator 1, and stator 2 are 
more likely to define the kind of end ring, core material 
(shaft), and squirrel cage than vice versa. Changes in 
these in-cycle components will cause changes elsewhere 
in the system until all changes and iterations are 
completed [5]. On the other hand, it is unlikely for a 
component with low inbound and outbound dependency 
to be a cyclic component. To clarify Figure 3., inbound 
and outbound dependency values are provided in Figure 
4.  For clarity and legibility, Figure 4. does not list all 
components. 
Non-critical components in this system include the 
feed water pump and the bearings shield. Their 
outbound and inbound dependencies are quite low, 
implying that neither buyer nor supplier is 
technologically locked-in to the other. There are likely 
several feed water pumps and bearing shields that could 
easily be adjusted to this system, thus increasing the 
availability of suppliers from the buyer’s perspective. 
Leverage components in the turbo generator include 
the frame and the bed. These components have high 
inbound dependencies and, thus, require extensive 
adaptation to system requirements. When the buyer 
assembles the overall system, the supplier must follow 
the buyer’s technological specifications for these parts, 
resulting in buyer-specific investments for the supplier 
and increasing the supplier’s dependence.  
Buyer purchases of components like the rotor, stator 
1, and stator 2 could create a supplier-dominated 
situation. These components have high outbound 
dependencies and low inbound dependencies. They 
occupy high positions in the component hierarchy, so 
other components adapt to them (not vice versa). Thus, 
the supplier has no technological incentive to make  
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Figure 3.-4. Inbound and outbound component dependencies.
compatibility changes for a certain buyer. Rather, 
compatibility is the buyer’s responsibility, potentially 
requiring buyer-side investments and increasing the 
buyer’s dependence on the supplier. We argue that if a 
buyer outsources bottleneck items, the supplier is likely 
to have significant technological expertise in these 
items.  
When one is studying systems empirically, not all 
system components will demonstrate all possible 
purchasing categories. In this illustrative example, 
purely strategic components with high outbound and 
inbound dependencies do not exist; thus, no concrete 
example of a strategic turbo generator component is 
provided, and only examples of bottleneck, critical, and 
leverage components are shown.  
5. Discussion 
 
In this conceptual paper we have developed a 
framework that connects component’s technological 
dependencies and its purchasing category. Component 
dependencies at the system level are presented as 
inbound and outbound dependencies. Technological 
dependencies are connected to switching costs, 
relationship-specific investments, and the need for 
another party’s technological expertise. In turn, these 
three factors show in which purchasing category 
component belong to, according to literature. In this 
paper the buyer is seen as the system owner and 
integrator, who assemble the system entity. This paper 
makes several contributions to the literatures on 
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 strategic purchasing. First, we propose metrics of 
inbound and outbound dependence to assess switching 
costs, investments, and the need for technological 
expertise in buyer-supplier relationships. The most 
important contribution is a theoretical framework in 
which technological dependencies determine 
components’ purchasing categories. The division of 
components into purchasing categories has historically 
been problematic because theory provides no 
prescriptions or procedures for accurate measurement. 
Purchasing category dimensions rely on nebulous, 
subjective  concepts, such as supply risk or profit 
impact, instead of operationalized measures [9] [10] 
even if purchasing strategies are developed according to 
categories. As implication of our theoretical 
contribution, the way how components are divided to 
purchasing categories can be done more objectively.  
Technological dependencies form a continuum, 
allowing the detection of locations between purchasing 
categories. Technological dependencies are relatively 
easy to measure; thus, our framework (unlike existing 
subjective frameworks) can be validated and utilized by 
researchers and practitioners alike. Our framework does 
not propose that previous measures of supply risk and 
profit impact are incorrect. We speculate that if a 
leverage component with high inbound dependencies is 
customized to a buyer, its profit impact could be higher 
than that of a non-customized (non-critical) component. 
If a buyer would adapt its system to a bottleneck 
component with high outbound dependence, it cannot 
easily switch suppliers, increasing perceived supply 
risk. Strategic component (with high outbound and 
inbound dependence) is adapting to other components 
that are higher or same level in technical hierarchy 
which may increase its profit impact. Simultaneously 
there are other components that are lower in hierarchy 
than strategic component, and those components must 
adapt to strategic component which increases supply 
risk. The buyer may perceive simultaneously high profit 
impact and supply risk of strategic component.  
The literature shows that the buyer firm can move a 
component’s purchasing portfolio category [21]. Our 
theoretical framework does not support category 
changes in cases of identical architecture. The 
technological dependencies remain in the system, 
regardless of the buying firm’s actions. Thus, one could 
question whether a buying firm can move its 
components and suppliers to another purchasing 
category simply by changing its strategy (and not its 
system architecture); however, industry-wide standards 
could enable such movements. The category movement 
discussion could benefit from the inclusion of the 
system architecture viewpoint. 
Knowledge of technological dependencies is crucial 
for managers, since these affect relationship 
characteristics like switching costs, investments, needs 
for technological expertise, and purchasing strategy 
selection. As practical implication, our research 
illustrates what kind of situations technological 
dependencies create. Our theoretical framework could 
bridge engineers and business managers, since 
engineering decisions regarding system structure 
interact with buyer-supplier relationship characteristics. 
Though our theory takes the system’s technological 
structure as a given, design choices should be made with 
input from the purchasing perspective [18]. 
This research has its limitations. We assume that 
buyers are the assemblers and integrators of systems 
with (potentially) multiple suppliers. Otherwise, our 
theoretical framework is not applicable. Outbound and 
inbound dependence require a technological system 
context; if system integration is not the buyer’s 
responsibility, this falls to another supply chain actor. In 
such a case, the buyer-supplier relationship is defined by 
factors other than inbound and outbound dependence. 
Second, if all system components have the same 
inbound and outbound dependencies (e.g. in systems 
with highly connected components; see [42]), our 
operationalization does not apply. Third, we assume that 
separate components have separate supplier 
relationships. In reality, one supplier can provide 
multiple parts, and relationships develop separately 
from individual components. We preserve the 
component-supplier linkage, since we do explore the 
dimensions of buyer-supplier relationships not linked to 
technology. Fourth, our theoretical framework does not 
consider dominant industry designs or mass supplier 
customizations. Dominant designs set industry 
specifications and reduce compatibility issues, thus 
changing the relationship dependence described in our 
framework. Similarly, mass customization can change a 
supplier’s dependence of a buyer by lowering the 
manufacturing costs of customized components [24]. 
Our theoretical framework should be tested empirically 
in future research (e.g. in the context of turbo 
generators), and the impacts of dominant designs and 
mass customization should be considered. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has developed a theoretical framework to 
explain how systems’ indirect and direct technological 
dependencies (inbound and outbound dependence) 
impact on buyers’ and suppliers’ switching costs, 
investments, needs for technological expertise and, 
ultimately, component purchasing categories. Previous 
research has divided components into purchasing 
categories without considering prevailing technological 
dependency. We extend the strategic purchasing 
literature by identifying how components’ technological 
dependencies relate to their purchasing categories. We 
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 believe that these considerations of technological 
dependencies are fruitful for purchasing research. 
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